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animal with low inertia and relatively 
large surface areas presented to 
varying airflow conditions can 
maintain strict body control and a 
rigidly-fixed position. Yet, there is 
theoretical and empirical evidence 
that the act of flapping itself can 
produce passive damping effects, 
which make stability and control 
of hovering maneuvers easier than 
might be expected. For example, if a 
hovering hummingbird is perturbed 
by a gust of wind into a rotational 
movement, the induced body rotation 
will create a velocity asymmetry — 
and therefore drag — of the 
flapping wings that will oppose the 
rotation (Figure 5). Analyses of this 
general effect — the combination 
of wing and body velocities during 
rotation — across a range of body 
sizes show that this flapping counter 
torque slows the rotation of small 
animals more quickly than it does 
large animals, and that it provides 
damping in all axes (pitch, roll and 
yaw), as well as linear perturbations 
such as sideslip.
Flapping counter torque stabilizing 
effects require that the wings are 
extended. Because of this, birds 
that fold their wings close to their 
body during upstroke to reduce the 
energy required for the recovery 
stroke will be inherently less stable. 
Given that hummingbirds may, in 
addition, manipulate upstroke lift forces 
to their benefit, the control and stability 
advantages of an aerodynamically 
active upstroke are clear, and may 
be as compelling an explanation for 
their unique flight style as the need for 
efficiency while hovering.
Whether the primary selective 
pressure was for steadier 
feeding at a nectar source or the 
increased efficiency provided by an 
aerodynamically active upstroke, 
the result is a diverse clade of birds, 
with an order of magnitude range 
in body size - at 20 g, the largest 
hummingbird, Patagona gigas, 
exceeds the mass of many small, 
non-nectivorous birds — able to 
emulate the utility of the insects 
flower nectar sources originally 
evolved to attract. As evidence 
of this emulation, since the early 
Oligocene, when the first modern 
hummingbirds appeared, the 
Trochilidae have diversified into 300+ 
species, and have co-evolved along 
with their nectar-provider plants 
into hummingbird-specific, and 
even species-specific mutualistic 
relationships, just as have their insect 
predecessors.
The convergence on form and 
function in insects and hummingbirds 
is a striking testament to the rigors 
of low speed flight and the ability 
of natural selection to respond to 
achieve comparable features of flight 
performance linked to nectivory, 
despite vastly different invertebrate 
and vertebrate body plans.
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The ability to learn which stimuli 
in the environment pose a threat 
is critical for adaptive functioning. 
Visual stimuli that are associated with 
threat when they are consciously 
perceived can evoke physiological [1] 
and neural [2] responses consistent 
with fear arousal even when they are 
later suppressed from awareness. It 
remains unclear, however, whether 
a specific new fear association 
can be acquired for stimuli that are 
never consciously seen [3], and 
whether such acquisition develops 
differently from conscious learning. 
It has recently been suggested [4] 
that, rather than simply affording 
a degraded version of conscious 
experience, processing of emotional 
stimuli without awareness may 
differ qualitatively from conscious 
perception, evoking different 
patterns of neural activity across 
the brain or differences in the 
time-course of behavioral and 
physiological responses. Here, we 
investigated nonconscious fear 
acquisition and how it may differ from 
conscious learning using classical 
fear conditioning, and found that 
conscious and unconscious fear 
acquisition both occur, but evolve 
differently over time. 
We presented observers with 
monocular conditioned stimuli (CSs, 
a male and female fearful face) that 
could be suppressed from awareness 
for long durations (4 seconds) 
by salient dynamic stimulation of 
the other eye (continuous flash 
suppression, CFS; Figure 1A). One 
image (CS+) co-terminated with a 
mild shock to the wrist on 50% of its 
presentations; the other (CS–) was 
never paired with shock. (We define 
fear in this context as an anticipatory 
physiological response to a stimulus 
that predicts an aversive outcome. 
This is measured by phasic increases 
in skin conductance responses 
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Figure 1. Results of fear learning experiments.
(A) The continuous flash suppression (CFS) display. The aware group saw the same display, 
without the colorful, dynamic suppressor. (B) Normalized SCR differences for the aware and 
unaware groups. *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ns, not significant; blue/red asterisks, comparison with 
zero; black asterisks, comparison between indicated bars. (C) Correlations between state anxi-
ety and fear learning during the stage at which learning occurred for each group.(SCRs), which arise from autonomic 
nervous system arousal.)
We assessed fear learning using 
the normalized difference between 
average SCRs evoked by the 
CS+ and CS– (see Supplemental 
Information available on-line with 
this issue for detailed experimental 
procedures). Critically, we measured 
SCRs during early and late 
acquisition (first versus second half 
of all non-reinforced trials) to track 
the development of learning over 
time [5]. Two groups of participants 
were conditioned with identical CSs: 
for one, CFS was used on all trials, 
suppressing the CSs from awareness
(unaware group), whereas for the 
other CFS was never used (aware 
group).
To verify successful manipulation 
of awareness, after each trial 
participants were asked to indicate 
which face had been presented, 
and to rate their confidence from 
1 (guess) to 3 (sure). We reasoned 
that objective (chance-level, 50% 
identification) and subjective 
(reported guessing) unawareness, 
coupled with physiological 
conditioning (greater SCR to the 
CS+ than CS–) would indicate 
nonconscious fear learning. Indeed, 
the unaware group’s performance  
(46%) was at chance; participants 
reported guessing on nearly all trials, 
and their confidence ratings did not 
differ between correct (M = 1.09) 
and incorrect (M = 1.06) responses 
(p = 0.73). For the aware group, 
performance was nearly perfect 
(97%) and confidence was high 
(M = 2.90; see also Supplemental 
Information for detailed results and 
statistical analyses). 
We found significantly greater 
SCRs to the CS+ compared with 
the CS– in both groups. However, 
we observed a striking difference 
in the temporal pattern of these 
physiological responses. Consistent 
with previous research [5], learning in 
the aware group increased over time, 
only becoming significant during late 
acquisition. In contrast, participants 
conditioned without awareness 
showed significant learning only 
during early acquisition (Figure 1B, 
and Supplemental Figure S1) — fear 
was thus acquired rapidly, but was 
also quick to decline. Furthermore, at 
the stage in which learning occurred, 
the difference between groups in 
magnitude of learning did not reach 
significance (p = 0.09). 
The groups did, however, differ 
in the pattern of responses to each 
CS across the experiment: In the unaware group, there was a specific 
reduction in the initially large average 
response to the CS+, whereas 
average SCRs to the CS– remained 
consistent across the session’s 
two halves. Conversely, for the 
aware group there was a reduction 
in average responses to the CS–, 
but not the CS+ (Figure S1). Both 
groups thus showed conditioning, but 
differed in the pattern of response to 
each CS. This additional qualitative 
difference suggests that the pattern 
underlying fear-conditioning, rather 
than just the difference between CS+ 
and CS–, may be revealing in itself: 
awareness may allow inhibition of 
arousal responses to stimuli that 
predict safety, whereas without 
awareness, early responses to stimuli 
that predict danger are amplified.
Participants completed the 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory before the experiment. 
Previous research has shown that 
higher anxiety impairs discrimination 
between safe and threatening stimuli 
[6] and anxiety modulates amygdala 
activity [7]. Indeed, the magnitude 
of differential conditioning was 
negatively correlated with state 
anxiety for both groups, but only 
during the stage in which learning 
occurred (early for unaware, late for 
aware participants; Figure 1C).
What underlies the rapid decline 
of nonconscious conditioning? 
Learning may have dissipated due 
to habituation, whereby differential 
responses attenuated despite 
a stable association forming. 
Alternatively, suppressing the CSs 
from awareness may have allowed 
initial differentiation between the CS+ 
and CS– but prevented the formation 
of a stable association, leading to 
rapid forgetting. To distinguish these 
possibilities, in a second experiment 
a new unaware group underwent 
only the early acquisition portion 
(first half) of the original experiment, 
to maximize learning. Participants 
were tested again 24 hours later 
with the same stimuli, but without 
reinforcement, so any differential 
response could only be attributed 
to learning on the first day. If 
conditioning in the first experiment 
had declined because of habituation, 
it should reemerge a day later; if 
the decline were due to forgetting, 
we would not expect differential 
fear responses to be observed on 
the second day. Results from day 1 
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Tom40 is likely 
common to all 
mitochondria
Vojtech Zarsky, Jan Tachezy,  
and Pavel Dolezal*
The evolution of the mitochondrion 
has involved the remodelling of the 
two membranes that enclose this 
organelle. During the transformation 
of the endosymbiotic bacterium into a 
genetically dependent organelle, the 
flow of proteins across the membranes 
reversed. This change is reflected by 
the distinct sets of protein transport 
machinery that operate in bacterial and 
mitochondrial membranes [1]. One of 
the exceptions is a b-barrel assembly 
machine, Sam50, a member of the 
Omp85 superfamily of proteins, which 
has been retained in the mitochondrial 
membranes. Other core components 
of mitochondrial translocases, such 
as Tom40 in the outer membrane and 
the Tim17 family of proteins in the 
inner membrane, cannot be directly 
related to any bacterial proteins. 
Two studies by Pusnik et al. recently 
showed that the mitochondrion of 
Trypanosoma brucei was found to be 
devoid of the essential Tom40 channel 
[2]; instead, it was found to contain 
an essential protein called the archaic 
translocase of the outer mitochondrial 
membrane (ATOM) that was directly 
linked to bacterial YtfM proteins, 
which are members of the Omp85 
superfamily [3]. Thus, it was suggested 
by Pusnik et al. that ATOM and 
Tom40 represent mutually exclusive 
functional analogues of distinct origins 
[3]. We analysed the ATOM amino 
acid sequences to identify homology 
to known protein families and to 
determine the phylogenetic distribution 
of the closest relatives of ATOM. 
Surprisingly, our results clearly refute 
the link between ATOM and bacterial 
Omp85-like proteins. Moreover, we 
propose that ATOM is, in fact, a 
divergent form of the ‘classical’ Tom40.
Tom40 and members of the 
Omp85 superfamily are b-barrel 
transmembrane proteins [4]. They 
form the rigid channels in the outer 
membranes of bacteria, plastids 
and mitochondria, where they 
guide substrates across or into the 
membrane. The pore-forming b-barrel 
structure does not require a precise replicated the original experiment: 
SCRs to the CS+ were significantly 
greater than for the CS– (p < 0.05; 
Figure S2), and correlated negatively 
with state anxiety. On day 2, however, 
SCRs to the CS+ and CS– no 
longer differed. Unlike conscious 
fear learning, which is known to 
persist over time [5], fear acquired 
nonconsciously is thus subject to 
rapid forgetting. 
Previous attempts to investigate 
nonconscious conditioning (for 
example, [8]) used backward masking 
to suppress briefly-presented 
stimuli from awareness. However, 
the methodological limitations 
of masking (see Supplemental 
Information), as well as insufficiently 
rigorous measures of awareness 
used in past studies [3], have left 
the question of whether a new 
fear association can be learned 
nonconsciously unresolved. Here we 
used CFS to suppress long-duration 
CSs from awareness reliably (as 
assessed by both objective and 
subjective measures), and found 
that although the overall magnitude 
of nonconscious fear learning is 
comparable to conscious learning, 
it is characterized by a distinct 
temporal pattern. Conscious fear 
developed progressively over time, 
whereas nonconscious fear was 
acquired rapidly and declined swiftly. 
The mechanisms underlying 
conscious and nonconscious 
fear conditioning may thus fulfill 
complementary roles: The initial 
orienting response that allows a 
stimulus to be associated with 
threat may not require awareness, 
but the long-term retention and 
expression of such learning does. 
Both conscious and nonconscious 
conditioning likely involve the 
amygdala, a brain region critical for 
the acquisition and expression of fear 
[9]. The amygdala plays a role in the 
automatic detection and processing 
of subliminally-presented affective 
stimuli [4], but has a tendency to 
rapidly habituate, especially to 
emotionally-laden stimuli [10]. Such 
habituation may, in turn, prevent the 
formation of a stable fear association, 
which might lead to rapid forgetting 
in the absence of other processes 
that involve awareness. The neural 
mechanisms that distinguish 
learning with and without awareness 
are thus fertile ground for further 
investigation.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes 
two figures and supplemental experi-
mental procedures and can be found 
with this article online at doi:10.1016/
j.cub.2012.04.023.
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